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This paper characterizes the efficient sequential equilibrium when a government uses indirect control
to exert its authority. We develop a dynamic principal-agent model in which a principal (a government)
delegates the prevention of a disturbance—such as riots, protests, terrorism, crime, or tax evasion—to
an agent who has an advantage in accomplishing this task. Our setting is a standard dynamic principal-
agent model with two additional features. First, the principal is allowed to exert direct control by intervening
with an endogenously determined intensity of force which is costly to both players. Second, the principal
suffers from limited commitment. Using recursive methods, we derive a fully analytical characterization
of the likelihood, intensity, and duration of intervention. The first main insight from our model is that
repeated and costly interventions are a feature of the efficient equilibrium. This is because they serve
as a punishment to induce the agent into desired behavior. The second main insight is a detailed analysis
of a fundamental tradeoff between the intensity and duration of intervention which is driven by the
principal’s inability to commit. Finally, we derive sharp predictions regarding the impact of various
factors on likelihood, intensity, and duration of intervention. We discuss these results in the context
of some historical episodes.
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In exerting their authority, governments often use indirect control: Certain political re-
sponsibilities are left to local agents or warlords who have an advantage in ful￿lling them.
These tasks range from the provision of law and order, the prevention of riots and protests,
the control of terrorism and insurgency, to the collection of taxes. For example, by the
￿rst century, the Romans had established a series of client states and chieftaincies along
their borders which gave them control of a vast territory with great economy of force.
These clients were kept in line by a combination of subsidies and favors and by the threat
of occasional military intervention.1 Beyond Roman times, this strategy of indirect con-
trol through local agents has been used by the British during colonial times and the Turks
during the Ottoman era, and it is tacitly used today by many governments.2 This sug-
gests the following question: What are the trade-o￿s faced by a government in the use of
rewards and interventions to allign the incentives of the local agent with its own?
In answering this question, it is important to take into account that the interaction
between a government and a local agent is inherently dynamic, and that there are three
key political economy frictions to consider.
First, the local agent cannot commit to ful￿lling his delegated task. Second, the local
agent’s actions, which often occur through informal channels, are imperfectly observed
by the government. Third, the government cannot commit to providing rewards or using
interventions. While the ￿rst two constraints point to a classic moral hazard problem,
in this context it is important to take into account how the third constraint interacts
with the ￿rst two. As such, a modi￿ed dynamic principal-agent model (in which the
government is the principal) can provide guidance on the implications of these frictions.
In this paper, we develop such a model. The principal delegates the prevention of a
disturbance{such as riots, protests, terrorism, crime, or tax evasion{to an agent who has
an advantage in accomplishing this task. Our setting is a standard dynamic principal-
agent model with two additional features which are natural in our application.3 First,
1See Syme (1933) and Luttwak (1976).
2This is particularly the case in governments that have tenuous control over parts of their territory, for
instance, in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas and in rural areas in many African countries.
On this point, see Herbst (2000) and Reno (1998). Recent interventions such as Pakistan in its tribal
territories, Russia in Chechnya, Israel in the Palestinian Territories, or Indonesia in Banda Aceh arguably
￿t the pattern. The United Kingdom also suspended local administration and deployed the army during
The Troubles in Northern Ireland from 1968 to 1998.
3The literature on dynamic principal-agent relationships is vast and cannot be summarized here. Some
examples are Acemoglu, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2008), Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2002), Ambrus
and Egorov (2009), Atkeson and Lucas (1992), Fong and Li (2009), Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski
(2003), Phelan (1995), and Thomas and Worrall (1990). Also see Debs (2009), Egorov and Sonin (2009),
1the principal is allowed to exert direct control by intervening with an endogenously de-
termined intensity of force which is costly to both players. Second, the principal su￿ers
from limited commitment. We focus on characterizing the likelihood, intensity, and du-
ration of intervention in the e￿cient sequential equilibrium. Using the recursive methods
of Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990), we derive a fully analytical characterization.
The ￿rst main insight from our model is that repeated and costly interventions are a
feature of this equilibrium. This is because they serve as a punishment to induce the
agent into desired behavior.4 A second insight, which emerges from our explicit charac-
terization, is the existence of a fundamental tradeo￿ between the intensity and duration
of intervention that is driven by the principal’s inability to commit. Finally, we derive
sharp predictions regarding the impact of various factors on the likelihood, intensity, and
duration of intervention.
More speci￿cally, we construct a repeated game between a principal and an agent
where in every period, the principal decides whether or not to intervene. Under interven-
tion, he chooses the intensity of force, where higher intensity is costly to both the agent
and the principal (i.e., it does not help to reduce the probability of a disturbance) and
features diminishing returns (i.e., the marginal pain in￿icted on the agent is decreasing
in intensity). The principal cannot commit to future actions. If the principal does not
intervene, the agent can reduce the probability of disturbances by exerting unobservable
e￿ort which can be high or low. Both players are strictly better o￿ under high e￿ort by the
agent compared to intervention by the principal. Nonetheless, there are two limitations to
the extent to which intervention can be avoided. First, the agent cannot commit to high
e￿ort once the threat of intervention has subsided. Second, the principal does not observe
the agent’s e￿ort, and since disturbances might happen even under high e￿ort, the agent
can always unobservably deviate and pretend to have exerted high e￿ort. Therefore, the
Nash equilibrium of the stage game is intervention with minimal force (i.e., direct control).
We consider the e￿cient sequential equilibrium of this game in which reputation sustains
Guriev (2004), and Myerson (2008) for applications to delegation problems in dictatorships.
4The use of costly interventions as punishment is very common in situations of indirect control. In
his discussion of the Ottoman Empire, Luttwak (2007) writes:
"The Turks were simply too few to hunt down hidden rebels, but they did not have
to: they went to the village chiefs and town notables instead, to demand their surrender,
or else. A massacre once in a while remained an e￿ective warning for decades. So it was
mostly by social pressure rather than brute force that the Ottomans preserved their rule: it
was the leaders of each ethnic or religious group inclined to rebellion that did their best to
keep things quiet, and if they failed, they were quite likely to tell the Turks where to ￿nd
the rebels before more harm was done." (p.40)
2equilibrium actions, and we fully characterize in closed form the long run dynamics of the
e￿cient sequential equilibrium.
Our ￿rst result is that repeated and costly interventions are a feature of the e￿cient
equilibrium. Speci￿cally, the equilibrium after a su￿cient number of disturbances features
two phases of play: a cooperative phase and a punishment phase that sustain each other.
In the cooperative phase, the agent exerts high e￿ort because he knows that a disturbance
can trigger a transition to the punishment phase. In the punishment phase, the principal
temporarily intervenes with a unique endogenous level of intensive force. The principal
exerts costly force because failure to do so triggers the agent to choose low e￿ort in
all future cooperative phases, making direct control{i.e., permanent intervention with
minimal intensity{a necessity. Importantly, the strategy which maximizes the principal’s
welfare under cooperation also minimizes the agent’s welfare under punishment. This is
because conditional on the agent exerting high e￿ort, the e￿cient strategy must minimize
the likelihood of punishment. To keep the agent’s incentive constraint satis￿ed, minimum
likelihood is achieved by providing the worst feasible payo￿ to the agent in the punishment
phase.5
This characterization of the equilibrium is related to the insights due to the model
of Green and Porter (1984) who present an example of a sequential equilibrium with
two oligopolistic ￿rms playing symmetric strategies which alternate between cooperation
and price wars. Importantly, in contrast to this work, our result emerges in a setting
in which we consider the e￿cient equilibrium under general history-dependent strategies,
and using the methods of Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) we explictly characterize
our equilibrium and consider tradeo￿s and comparative statics.
Our second result follows from our explicit characterization of the worst feasible pun-
ishment to the agent. Recall that the principal cannot commit to future actions. As a
consequence, he can always deviate to permanent direct control, which constitutes his
min-max payo￿. This generates an incentive compatibility constraint on the side of the
principal that produces a fundamental tradeo￿ between the duration and the intensity
of credible interventions. In particular, he can only be induced to intervene with costly
intensity if cooperation is expected to resume in the future, and higher intensity is only
incentive compatible if cooperation resumes sooner. This link between intensity and du-
ration generates a non-monotonic relationship between intensity and the agent’s welfare
under punishment. At low levels of intensity, the agent’s welfare naturally declines when
5This pattern of repeated military intervention is arguably alligned with many of the examples de-
scribed in footnote 2. For instance, Jaeger and Paserman (2008) ￿nd that Israel occasionally responds to
Palestinian attacks with interventions whereas Palestinian terrorist attacks are random.
3intensity rises. However, at higher levels of intensity, diminishing returns set in and the
counteracting e￿ect of shorter duration makes his expected welfare actually increasing in
intensity. Since the principal seeks to minimize the agent’s welfare under punishment, it
follows that there is a unique and interior level of intensity that is used.
Our ￿nal result concerns the e￿ect of three important factors on the likelihood, inten-
sity, and duration of intervention in the e￿cient equilibrium. First, we consider the e￿ect
of a decline in the cost of intensity to the principal. Second, we consider the e￿ect of a
rise in the cost of disturbances to the principal. Finally, we consider the e￿ect of a rise in
the cost of e￿ort to the agent.
We show that all three changes increase the intensity and decrease the duration of
intervention. In the ￿rst case, it is clear that a reduction in the marginal cost of intensity
increases its use. In the second case, as the cost of disturbances rises, so do the returns
to leveraging the comparative advantage of the agent. As the prospect of direct control
becomes worse, the principal is willing to raise the intensity of intervention. In the third
case, as the cost of e￿ort for the agent rises, higher levels of intensity become necessary to
satisfy the agent’s incentive constraint. In all three cases, due to the principal’s incentive
constraint, these increases in the level of intensity necessitate a decline in the duration of
intervention.
Even though all three changes increase the intensity and decrease the duration of in-
tervention, only the third also raises its likelihood. Speci￿cally, if the cost of intensity
to the principal declines or if the cost of disturbances to the principal rises, then harsher
punishments are feasible. Because the agent’s incentive compatibility constraint is slack-
ened by these changes, such punishments can be applied less often without weakening
incentives for the agent. Therefore, the likelihood of intervention declines. In contrast, if
the cost of e￿ort to the agent rises, then incentives are harder to provide for the agent,
and the likelihood of intervention must rise following the realization of a disturbance.6
As an aside, note that our benchmark model ignores three additional issues. First, it
ignores the possibility that permanent concessions by the principal can reduce the presence
of disturbances in the future. Second, it ignores the possibility that the agent’s identity
can change over time because of political transitions. Third, it ignores the possibility that
high intensity levels by the principal today can raise the cost of e￿ort by the agent in the
future, for example if the agent becomes more antagonistic. These issues are discussed in
our extensions which show that our main conclusions are unchanged.
6In other words, when the cost of e￿ort increases, the principal uses two margins to adjust punishments.
He increases both intensity and likelihood to meet the tighter incentive compatibility constraint of the
agent.
4This paper contributes to three di￿erent literatures. First, it contributes to the dy-
namic principal-agent literature described in footnote 3 by allowing for costly intervention
by a principal who su￿ers from limited commitment. Speci￿cally, our model has the same
structure as Fong and Li (2009) who also consider the e￿ect of limited commitment by the
principal in a labor market setting, though in contrast to their work we allow for costly
intervention. Second, our paper contributes to the literature on costly political con￿ict by
providing a formal framework for investigating the transitional dynamics between con￿ict
and cooperation.7 In particular, our model bears a similar structure to Yared (2009),
though in contrast to this work, we introduce variable intervention intensity which allows
for payo￿s below the repeated static Nash equilibrium. This implies that, in contrast to
this work, phases of intervention cannot last forever and must necessarily precede phases
of cooperation. Third, our paper contributes to the literature on punishments dating back
to the work of Becker (1968). In contrast to this work which considers static models, we
consider a dynamic environment in which the government lacks the commitment to pun-
ish.8 This allows for an analysis of the e￿cient time structure of punishments together
with the tradeo￿ between the duration and intensity of punishments.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 de￿nes
the e￿cient sequential equilibrium. Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium and provides
our main results. Section 5 provides extensions, and we discuss our results in the context
of some historical episodes in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. The Appendix contains all
proofs and additional material not included in the text.
2 Model
We consider a dynamic environment in which a principal seeks to induce an agent into
limiting disturbances. In every period, the principal has two options. On the one hand,
he can forcefully intervene to control disturbances himself, and in doing so he chooses the
intensity of force. On the other hand, the principal can withhold force and allow the agent
to exert unobservable e￿ort in controlling disturbances. In this situation, if a disturbance
7Some examples of work in this literature are Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), Anderlini, Gerardi, and
Laguno￿ (2009), Baliga and Sj￿ ostr￿ om (2004), Chassang and Padr￿ o i Miquel (2009), Esteban and Ray
(2008), Fearon (1995), Jackson and Morelli (2008), and Powell (1999). Schwarz and Sonin (2004) show
that the ability commit to randomizing between costly con￿ict and cooperation can induce cooperation.
We do not assume the ability to commit to randomization, and the realization of costly con￿ict is driven
by future expectations.
8Some examples of models of punishments are Acemoglu and Wolitsky (2009), Dal B￿ o and Di Tella
(2003), Dal B￿ o, Dal B￿ o and di Tella (2006), and Polinski and Shavell (1979,1984). We discuss our
relationship to the literature on punishments in greater detail in Section 4.2.
5occurs, the principal cannot determine if it is due to the agent’s negligence or due to
bad luck. In addition to this informational asymmetry, both the principal and the agent
su￿er from limited commitment. In our benchmark model, we rule out payments from the
principal to the agent{which are standard in the dynamic principal-agent literature{since
our focus on is on the use of interventions. This is done purely for expositional simplicity.
We allow for payments in Section 5.1 and show that none of our results are altered.
More formally, there are time periods t = f0;:::;1g where in every period t, the
principal (p) and the agent (a) repeat the following interaction. The principal publicly
chooses ft = f0;1g, where ft = 1 represents a decision to intervene. If ft = 1, then
the principal publicly decides the intensity of force it ￿ 0. In this case, the payo￿ to
the principal is ￿￿p￿ ￿ Ait and the payo￿ to the agent is wa ￿ g (it), where A > 0 and
g0 (￿);￿g00 (￿) > 0 with g (0) = 0, g0 (0) = 1, and limit!1 g0 (it) = 0. The concavity of
g (￿) captures the fact that there are diminishing returns to the use of intensity by the
principal. The parameter A captures the marginal cost of intensive force.9 Within the
term ￿￿p￿￿Ait is embedded the cost of a stochastic disturbance, where ￿p represents the
probability of such a disturbance and ￿ represents its cost to the principal. Analogously,
within the term wa ￿ Ag (it) is the cost of the damage su￿ered by the agent when the
principal intervenes.10
Importantly, conditional on intervention by the principal, both the principal and the
agent are strictly better o￿ under minimal force. Intuitively, choosing it > 0 imposes more
physical damage on the agent. Moreover, it is statically ine￿cient from the perspective
of the principal since it is more costly to use and does not diminish the likelihood of a
disturbance. Therefore, conditional on ft = 1, the principal would always choose it = 0
in a one-shot version of this game.
The proper interpretation of it = 0 is not the absence of force, but rather the principal’s
statically optimal level of force, meaning the level of intensity associated with the principal
seeking to directly minimize immediate disturbances. Thus, wa corresponds to the agent’s
disutility under this level intensity. This normalization has no qualitative e￿ect on our
results and yields considerable notational ease.11
The principal can also decide to not intervene by choosing ft = 0. In this case, the
agent privately chooses whether to exert high e￿ort (et = ￿) or low e￿ort (et = 0 < ￿) in
preventing a disturbance. Nature then stochastically chooses the realization of a publicly
9For instance, A can decline if there is less international rebuke for the use of force.
10In practice, the agent can be a leader, a political party, or an entire society. In situations in which
the agent is a group, the damage su￿ered by the agent can involve the killing of members of the group.
11More generally, all of our results hold if the level of intensity is costly to the principal but also a￿ects
the probability ￿p of a disturbance under intervention if ￿p is a convex function of intensity.
6observed disturbance st = f0;1g, where st = 0 represents the absence of a disturbance.
If a disturbance does not occur, the principal receives 0, and if it occurs, the principal
receives ￿￿. Independently of the shock, the agent loses et from exerting e￿ort. The
stochastic realization of a disturbance occurs as follows. If et = ￿, then a disturbance
occurs with probability ￿a (￿) 2 (0;1) and if et = 0, then it occurs with probability
￿a (0) 2 (￿a (￿);1]. Therefore, high e￿ort reduces the likelihood of a disturbance.12 The
parameter ￿ captures the cost of e￿ort to the agent.13 The game is displayed in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Game
Let uj (ft;it;et;st) represent the payo￿ to j at t, where value of it is only relevant if






tuj (ft;it;et;st), ￿ 2 (0;1).
12Due to the variety of applications, we do not take a stance on microfounding the source of distur-
bances. One can interpret these disturbances as being generated by a short-lived player who bene￿ts
from their realization (such as cross border raids into the Roman Empire by Germanic tribes) and who is
less successful under intervention by the principal or high e￿ort by the agent. Moreover, the realization
of a disturbance could stochastically force the principal to make a permanent concession bene￿cial to this
player. Under this interpretation, the principal may be able to unilaterally make a concession to end all
disturbances, a situation we consider in Section 5.2.
13The cost can rise for instance if it becomes more politically costly for the agent to antagonize rival
factions contributing to the disturbances. Alternatively, the agent might actually have an increased prefer-
ence for disturbances. In this case, without a￿ecting any of our results, one can modify the interpretation
so that et subsumes the fact that the agent receives utility from the realization of a disturbance.
7We make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 (ine￿ciency of intervention) ￿p > ￿a (￿) and ￿￿ > wa.
Assumption 2 (desirability of intervention) ￿a (0) > ￿p.
Assumption 1 states that, relative to payo￿s under intervention, both the principal and
the agent are strictly better o￿ if the agent exerts high e￿ort in preventing a disturbance.
Intuitively, the agent is better informed about the sources of disturbances and is better
than the principal at preventing them. Moreover, from an ex-ante perspective, the agent
prefers to exert high e￿ort to prevent a disturbance versus enduring the damage from any
intervention by the principal. In sum, this assumption implies that allowing the agent to
exert e￿ort dominates intervention by the principal.
Assumption 2 states that the principal is strictly better o￿ using intervention to pre-
vent a disturbance versus letting the agent exert low e￿ort in preventing such a distur-
bance. This assumption has an important implication. Speci￿cally, in a one-shot version
of this game, ft = 1 and it = 0 is the unique static Nash equilibrium. This is because
conditional on ft = 0, the agent chooses et = 0. Thus, by Assumption 2, the principal
chooses ft = 1 and it = 0. Since the agent cannot commit to controlling disturbances,
the principal must intervene to do so himself.14 We refer to this situation with ft = 1 and
it = 0 as direct control.
Permanent direct control is always a sequential equilibrium of the repeated game.
However, since it is ine￿cient (by Assumption 1), one can imagine that repeated game
strategies can enhance the welfare of both players. Nevertheless, there are three political
economy frictions to consider. First, the principal cannot commit to refraining from using
intervention in the future, since he also su￿ers from limited commitment. Moreover, he
cannot commit to using more than minimal force under intervention. Second, the agent
cannot commit to choosing high e￿ort. Finally, the principal does not observe the e￿ort
by the agent. Consequently, if a disturbance occurs, the principal cannot determine if
this is accidental (i.e., et = ￿) or if this is intentional (i.e., et = 0).
Note that our simple benchmark model ignores four additional issues. First, as we
mentioned, it ignores the possibility that the principal can pay the agent for reducing dis-
turbances. Second, it ignores the possibility that permanent concessions by the principal
can reduce the presence of disturbances in the future. Third, it ignores the possibility
14Assumption 2 facilitates exposition by guaranteeing a unique long run equilibrium. If it is violated,
the worst punishment to the principal is rede￿ned as equal to ￿￿a (0)￿=(1 ￿ ￿) and none of our main
results are changed. Section 5.2 provides an extension with a permanent concession which is isomorphic
to this scenario.
8that the agent’s identity can change over time because of political transitions. Fourth,
it ignores the possibility that high intensity levels by the principal today can raise the
cost of e￿ort by the agent in the future, for example if the agent becomes more antago-
nistic. These issues are discussed in Section 5 which shows that our main conclusions are
unchanged.
3 Equilibrium De￿nition
In this section, we present our recursive method for the characterization of the e￿cient
sequential equilibria of the game. We provide a formal de￿nition of these equilibria in
the Appendix. The important feature of a sequential equilibrium is that each player
dynamically chooses his best response given the strategy of his rival at every public
history.15
Since we are concerned with e￿ciency, we characterize the set of equilibria which
maximize the period 0 welfare of the principal subject to providing the agent with some
minimal period 0 welfare U0. The most important feature of these equilibria due to
the original insight achieved by Abreu (1988) is that they are sustained by the worst
punishment. More speci￿cally, all public deviations from equilibrium actions by a given
player lead to his worst punishment o￿ the equilibrium path, which we denote by J for








because the principal cannot receive a lower payo￿ than under permanent direct control,
as he could revert to it at any point. Moreover, for the same reason, the agent can be
credibly punished by the principal at least as harshly as under permanent direct control.
Note that in characterizing this equilibrium, we take into account that it may be
e￿cient for players to choose correlated strategies so as to potentially randomize over the
choice of intervention, intensity, and e￿ort. Let zt = fz1
t;z2
tg 2 Z ￿ [0;1]
2 represent a
pair of i.i.d. publicly observed random variables independent of st, of all actions, and
of each other, where these are drawn from a bivariate continuous c.d.f. G(￿). Let z1
t be
revealed prior to the choice of ft so as to allow the principal to randomize over the use of
15Because the principal’s strategy is public by de￿nition, any deviation by the agent to a non-public
strategy is irrelevant (see Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin, 1994).
9intervention and let z2
t be revealed immediately following the choice of ft so as to allow
the principal to randomize over intensity or the agent to randomize over the e￿ort.
As is the case in many incentive problems, an e￿cient sequential equilibrium can be
represented in a recursive fashion, and this is a useful simpli￿cation for characterizing
equilibrium dynamics.16 Speci￿cally, at any public history, the entire public history of
the game is subsumed in the continuation value to each player, and associated with these
two continuation values is a continuation sequence of actions and continuation values.
More speci￿cally, let U represent the continuation value of the agent at a given history.
Associated with U is J (U), which represents the highest continuation value achievable by
the principal in a sequential equilibrium conditional on the agent achieving a continuation







z2Z ; the recursive program
which characterizes the e￿cient sequential equilibrium is
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(￿a (0) ￿ ￿a (ez)) ￿ ez 8z (6)
fz 2 [0;1], iz ￿ 0, and ez = f0;￿g 8z. (7)
(1) represents the continuation value to the principal written in a recursive fashion at
a given history. fz, iz, and ez represent the use of intervention, the choice of intensity, and
the choice of e￿ort, respectively, conditional on today’s random public signal z = fz1;z2g.
UF
z represents the continuation value promised to the agent for tomorrow conditional on
intervention being used today at z. If intervention is not used, then the continuation
value promised to the agent for tomorrow conditional on z is UH
z if s = 0 (there is no
disturbance) and UL
z if s = 1 (there is a disturbance). Note that fz depends only on z1
since it is chosen prior to the realization of z2, but all other variables depend on z1 as
16This is a consequence of the insights from the work of Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990).
10well as z2.
Equation (2) represents the promise keeping constraint which ensures that the agent
is achieving a continuation value of U. Constraints (7) ensure that the allocation is
feasible. Constraints (3) ￿ (6) represent the incentive compatibility constraints of this
game. Without these constraints, the solution to the problem starting from an initial
U0 is simple: The principal refrains from intervention forever. Constraints (3) ￿ (6)
capture the ine￿ciencies introduced by the presence of limited commitment and imperfect
information which ultimately lead to the need for intervention. Constraint (3) captures
the fact that at any history, the principal cannot commit to refraining permanent direct
control which provides a continuation welfare of J. Constraint (4) captures the fact
that at any history, the agent cannot commit to high e￿ort, as he can choose low e￿ort
forever and ensure himself a continuation value of at least U. Importantly, constraint
(5) captures the fact that at any history, the principal cannot commit to using intensive
force since this is costly. Constraint (5) ensures that the principal prefers to use intensive
force and be rewarded for it in the future compared to his best deviation which involves
using intervention with zero intensive force forever. Constraints (3) ￿ (5) capture the
constraint of limited commitment. Under perfect information, they imply that if players
are su￿ciently patient, the permanent absence of intervention can be sustained by the
o￿-equilibrium threat of intervention. Constraint (6) captures the additional constraint
of imperfect information: If the principal requests ez = ￿, the agent can always privately
choose ez = 0 without detection. Constraint (6) ensures that the agent’s punishment
from this deviation is weakly exceeded by the equilibrium path reward for choosing high
e￿ort.17
4 Analysis
We focus our analysis on the likelihood, the intensity, and the duration of intervention
which are formally de￿ned below.
De￿nition 1 (i) The likelihood of intervention at t is Prfft+1 = 1jft = 0 and st = 1g,
(ii) the intensity of intervention at t is E fitjft = 1g, and (iii) the duration of intervention
at t is Prfft+1 = 1jft = 1g.
This de￿nition states that the likelihood of intervention is the probability that the
principal intervenes following a disturbance; the intensity of intervention is the expected
17Note that we have ignored the constraint that the agent does not deviate to high e￿ort if ez = 0 since
such a constraint never binds in equilibrium.
11intensity of the force used by the principal; and the duration of intervention is the prob-
ability that intervention continues into the next period.
We also focus on long run equilibrium dynamics. We do so because these dynamics
can be explicitly characterized in closed form, and because we can show that phases of
intervention occur only in the long run.18 More speci￿cally, we ￿rst show in Section
4.1 that the e￿cient contract in the long run is characterized by two phases of play: a
cooperative phase and a punishment phase, where these two phases sustain each other.
Second, we describe in Section 4.2 an important tradeo￿ between the duration and the
intensity of intervention. Finally, in Section 4.3 we consider comparative statics.
To facilitate exposition, we assume that players are su￿ciently patient for the remain-
der of our discussion.
Assumption 3 (High Patience) ￿ > b ￿.





















represent an argument which solves (1) ￿ (7). Since ￿
￿ (U) may not be unique, we focus
on the unique solution which satis￿es the Bang-Bang property as described by Abreu,
Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990).20 In our context, the Bang-Bang property is satis￿ed if
the equilibrium continuation value pairs at t following the realization of z1
t are extreme
points in the set of sequential equilibrium continuation values. De￿ne
U = ￿
￿a (0)￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(￿a (0) ￿ ￿a (￿))
. (8)
18See Yared (2009) for a similar model which more explicitly describes short run transitional dynamics.
19This assumption guarantees that the likelihood of punishment is bounded away from 1 and that the
duration of punishment is bounded away from 0, which guarantees that the long run equilibrium can be
explicitly characterized. The value of b ￿ is below 1 as long as ￿ is su￿ciently bounded away from wa
so that permanent reversion to the static Nash equilibrium is a su￿cient enough threat to induce high
e￿ort.
20E￿cient equilibria which do not satisfy the Bang-Bang property emerge here in part because infor-
mation is coarse, an issue which is discussed in Yared (2009). The Bang-Bang equilibrium we describe
is the unique optimum if players are constrained to one-period memory and if a rich and asymptoti-






represent the long run probability that the agent receives a con-
tinuation value (following the realization of z1
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z (U) = U ￿ ￿=(￿ (￿a (0) ￿ ￿a (￿)))




(￿p ￿ ￿a (￿))￿ + Ai￿
￿￿ ￿ wa + g (i￿)
, and (9)
U = ￿
(￿p ￿ ￿a (￿))￿￿ + Ai￿ (wa ￿ g (i￿))
(1 ￿ ￿)((￿p ￿ ￿a (￿))￿ + Ai￿)
.
This proposition states that in the long run, continuation values are weakly below
U and it explicitly characterizes the solution for U ￿ U. More speci￿cally, in the long
run, the principal exerts a unique level of intensity i￿, the agent exerts high e￿ort, and
continuation values for tomorrow are conditioned on whether or not intervention is used
and whether or not a disturbance occurs in the absence of intervention. The continuation
value U is therefore provided to the agent by randomizing over a cooperative phase and
a punishment phase. In the cooperative phase, intervention is not used and the agent




, respectively, following the realization of z1
t. In the
punishment phase, intervention is used and the agent and principal receive U and J (U) =
J, respectively, following the realization of z1
t.
More speci￿cally, in the cooperative phase at t, the principal does not intervene (ft =
0) and the agent chooses high e￿ort (et = ￿). If there is no disturbance at t (st = 0),
then the cooperative phase at t + 1 occurs with probability 1. If there is a disturbance
at t (st = 1), then the cooperative phase at t + 1 occurs with probability 1 ￿ l￿, and
the punishment phase at t + 1 occurs with probability l￿. In contrast, in the punishment
13phase at t, principal chooses intervention (ft = 1) and a unique level of intensity it = i￿.
The punishment phase at t + 1 occurs with probability d￿ and the cooperative phase
at t + 1 occurs with probability 1 ￿ d￿. Note that given De￿nition 1, it is clear from
this characterization that the e￿cient likelihood, intensity, and duration of intervention
correspond to l￿, i￿, and d￿, respectively, and these can be characterized explicitly in our
framework.21
The intuition behind the second part of Proposition 1 is that in equilibrium, phases of
cooperation and phases of punishment sustain each other. In the cooperative phase, the
agent exerts high e￿ort because he knows that failure to do so raises the probability of a
disturbance which can trigger a transition to the punishment phase. In the punishment
phase, the principal temporarily intervenes with a unique level of intensive force. The
principal exerts costly force since he knows that failure to do so would trigger the agent
to choose low e￿ort in all future cooperative phases, making direct control{i.e., permanent
intervention with minimal intensity{a necessity.22
These long run cycles between punishment and cooperation are driven by the princi-
pal’s inability to commit. Recall that he can always take the option of permanent direct
control which ensures him a ￿ow payo￿ ￿￿p￿ per period. If he applies higher intensity
i￿ > 0 when he intervenes, he is receiving a ￿ow payo￿ below direct control. He would
only do so if in the future he expects phases in which he receives ￿ow payo￿s above ￿￿p￿.
These are the cooperative phases in which the agent exerts high e￿ort and the principal
receives ￿￿a (￿)￿.




are intimately linked. To formally see
why, consider the system of equations which characterizes the long run equilibrium:
U = ￿￿ + ￿
￿
(1 ￿ ￿a (￿)l
















= ￿￿a (￿)￿ + ￿
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(10) and (11) represent the continuation value to the agent during cooperation and pun-
ishment, respectively. (10) shows that in the cooperative phase, the agent exerts high
e￿ort today and faces two possibilities tomorrow. If a disturbance occurs and he is not
21More speci￿cally, UF￿





= (1 ￿ l￿)U + l￿U.
22More precisely, permanent direct control is one of many means of implementing the worst punish-
ment for the principal. There are many other continuation games which provide the principal with a
continuation value of J which can serve as punishment.
14forgiven, play moves to punishment and he obtains U. Otherwise, cooperation is main-
tained and he receives U tomorrow. (11) shows that in the punishment phase, the agent
endures punishment with intensity i￿ today, and he receives U tomorrow with probability
d￿ and U tomorrow with probability 1 ￿ d￿. (12) and (13) are analogously de￿ned for
the principal. In particular, (12) shows that during cooperation the principal su￿ers from
disturbances with probability ￿a (￿), and (13) shows that during punishment the principal
su￿ers from disturbances with a higher probability ￿p and he also su￿ers from intervening
with force.23
Crucially, the value of U does not depend on the value of i￿ since U is self-generating
in equilibrium.24 Moreover, as discussed in Section 3, J is independent of i￿ because it
simply corresponds to the repeated static Nash payo￿ to the principal{i.e., direct control.










This system of equations allows us to trace exactly how the cooperative and punish-
ment phases sustain each other. Since U is exogenously determined, equation (10) implies
that the lower is U, then the lower is the implied value of l￿. Intuitively, the harsher the





is decreasing in l￿. Since payo￿s under intervention are ￿xed for the principal,





is attained by the lowest U, as this makes for the longest sustainable cooperative
phase{i.e., the lowest sustainable likelihood of punishment l￿.





then the higher is the implied value of d￿, and the lower is the implied value of U. This
is because the higher the principal’s welfare under cooperation, the more easily can the
principal be induced to punish for longer, as his value under punishment is anchored at




. Consequently, the e￿cient
i￿ that maximizes the principal’s value of cooperation simultaneously also minimizes the
agent’s value of punishment U. In the next subsection we analyze this e￿cient choice of
i￿.
Before this analysis, we need to shed some light on the ￿rst part of Proposition 1.
In order to build some intuition, note that U is important for two reasons. First, it
can be shown that if U ￿ U, f￿
z (U) = 0 8z so that intervention is used with zero
probability. The reason is that punishing is too costly and ine￿cient for both the principal
23Note that equations (10) and (13) naturally emerge from equations (6) and (5), the incentive com-
patibility constraints on the agent and principal, respectively.











15and the agent, and hence it is never used if not absolutely necessary{i.e., unless the
promised value U is very low. It follows that continuation values have to eventually
travel below U. If there was zero probability of continuation values traveling below U,
then there would be zero probability of intervention along the equilibrium path, and the
agent would therefore choose low e￿ort forever. This would obviously violate the incentive
compatibility constraint of the principal by Assumption 2.25 Therefore, intervention must
occur along the equilibrium path to induce high e￿ort which means that continuation
values must eventually decline below U.
The second reason U is important is because once continuation values have declined
below U, in the future they cannot increase above U. This is again a consequence of the
ine￿ciency of punishing. The e￿cient equilibrium therefore delays forceful intervention as
much as possible. Due to the incentive compatibility constraint of the agent, such delay is
longer the lower is the value of the agent under punishment. Such value is kept at its lowest
by remaining in the cycle of punishment and cooperation (with high e￿ort by the agent)
forever, conditional on having arrived to a period of intervention. If instead continuation
values in the future were to move back above U after intervention, the principal would
be forced to intervene more often or more intensely from today onward in order to satisfy
the promise keeping constraint (2), which is ine￿cient.26
To understand equilibrium path dynamics, consider Figure 2 which depicts J (U) as a
function of U. The y-axis represents J (U) and the x-axis represents U, with U situated
on the x-axis. Note that an e￿cient equilibrium necessarily begins on the downward
sloping portion of J (U) since it is not possible to make the principal better o￿ along this
portion without making the agent worse o￿. Along the upward sloping portion of J (￿),
both the principal and agent can be made better o￿ from an increase in U since this is
associated with a lower probability of intervention which is costly to both players. Along
the downward sloping portion of J (￿), the principal is made worse o￿ from an increase
in U since this is associated with a higher probability realization of low e￿ort by the
agent which is costly to the principal but bene￿cial to the agent. Along the equilibrium
25In a model which allows for payments from the principal to the agent, the second part of Proposition 1
holds exactly, though the ￿rst part may not necessarily do so since a long enough absence of disturbances
can lead to the permanent absence of intervention. See Section 5.1 for a discussion.
26Technically, if UH￿
z (U) > U, then (6) would not bind which is ine￿cient by the concavity of J (￿).
The reason why UF￿
z (U) ￿ U is a consequence of Assumption 3 which states that the discount factor ￿ is
su￿ciently large. Intuitively, as ￿ rises, the constraint of limited commitment on the side of the principal
is slackened, which implies that the equilibrium approaches the commitment benchmark in which the
principal punishes forever (i.e., UF￿
z (U) approaches U).
Note that this ￿rst part of Proposition 1 holds for all solutions, not just those which satisfy the Bang-
Bang property.
16path, whenever the principal requests high e￿ort from the agent, he rewards (punishes)
the agent for the absence (realization) of a disturbance with an increase (decrease) in
continuation value. Therefore, the sequence of disturbances will eventually cause the
continuation value to the agent to decline below U, and it will remain there in the long
run.27
Figure 2: J (U)
4.2 Tradeo￿ between Intensity and Duration of Intervention
In this section, we consider the choice of intensity in the e￿cient equilibrium together with
its implications for the likelihood and duration of intervention. In doing so, we highlight
a fundamental tradeo￿ between the intensity and duration of intervention.
To this end, it is useful to consider the wider implications of the system given by
(10) ￿ (13). In particular, consider an exogenous level of intensity i{i.e., not necessarily
the optimal level i￿. For a given i, this system of equations is linear in four unknowns and
27For more details, see the Appendix.
17it is therefore solvable. Take the solutions for l￿ and d￿ given i, and call them l(i) and
d(i) as they are now a function of the exogenous level of i that we are considering. In
other words, l(i) corresponds to the likelihood of intervention under intensity i and d(i)
corresponds to the duration of intervention under intensity i.
Proposition 2 (e￿cient intervention) The optimal levels of l￿, i￿, and d￿ satisfy
l￿ = l(i￿) and d￿ = d(i￿) for i￿ de￿ned in (9) where l(￿) and d(￿) are continuously
di￿erentiable functions with l0 (i) < (>)0 if i < (>)i￿ and d0 (i) < 0.
Proposition 2 states that, in the set of equilibria with the same structure as the e￿cient
equilibrium, an increase in intensity reduces the likelihood of intervention for i < i￿ and
it increases the likelihood of intervention for i > i￿. Moreover, an increase in intensity
always reduces the duration of intervention. This proposition implies that there is a
tradeo￿ between the intensity and duration of intervention, and that the optimal level of
intensity i￿ corresponds to the point which minimizes the likelihood of intervention. This
proposition is displayed graphically in Figure 3, where intensity i is on the x-axis and
the implied likelihood and duration of intervention{l(i) and d(i), respectively{are on the
y-axis.
The principal’s incentives to intervene are the driving force behind Proposition 2.
Again, recall that the principal can always deviate to permanent direct control, which
gives him a ￿xed exogenous payo￿. As a consequence, if the intensity of intervention rises,
then the principal can only be induced to exert this level of intensity if the resumption
of cooperation following intervention is more likely. This is the logic behind (13) and it
implies that d0 (i) < 0, so that the duration of intervention is declining in intensity.
Now consider what this implies for the welfare of the agent under punishment, U. At
low levels of i, an increase in intensity naturally means that the prospect of punishment
is worse for the agent, and U decreases in i. However, at higher levels of i, diminishing
returns set in and the smaller marginal increase in pain g0(i) is outweighed by the reduction
in punishment duration implied by (13). As a consequence, above a certain i, U becomes
18increasing in i.
Figure 3: Likelihood, Intensity, and Duration of Intervention
Since the agent’s value under punishment ￿rst decreases and then increases with in-
tensity, the likelihood of intervention l(i) ￿rst decreases and then increases with intensity,
as implied by (10). As the punishment for the agent becomes worse, a smaller likelihood
of punishment is needed to satisfy (10). As previously discussed, lower likelihood is better
from the perspective of the principal because it maximizes the duration of cooperation
(i.e., the probability of transitioning to the cooperative phase tomorrow starting from the
cooperative phase today is maximized). Therefore, the principal always chooses the level
of intensity that minimizes likelihood. As stated in Proposition 2, this level is i￿.
As an aside, note that our selection of an interior point i￿ relies on our assumption
that g0 (0) is su￿ciently high. If g0 (0) were small, then one could construct environments
in which i￿ = 0 so that indirect control is not sustainable and the principal resorts to
permanent direct control, as in Yared (2009). Intuitively, the punishment to the agent is
not su￿ciently dire to warrant its use by the principal. Moreover, note that the uniqueness
of i￿ de￿ned in (9) is guaranteed by the global concavity of g (￿). If instead g (￿) were weakly
19convex, there would be no tradeo￿ between the duration and intensity of intervention, and
the optimal level of intensity would be either 0 or the maximal feasible level of intensity.
These results are related to static models of punishment which study a variety of
situations, such as extortion and slavery.28 They are also related to the law and eco-
nomics literature which considers the tradeo￿ between the likelihood of punishment (i.e.,
the probability of capturing criminals) and the harshness of punishment (i.e., the length
of incarceration).29 As in our environment, this literature establishes that choosing the
harshest existing punishment is suboptimal because costly punishments must be exercised
in equilibrium. Second, the law and economics literature highlights a complementarity
between the likelihood and the harshness of punishment which is also present in our frame-
work. More speci￿cally, in our model an increase l￿ and a reduction in U are complemen-




in contrast to our dynamic model, static models by de￿nition cannot distinguish between
the intensity and the duration of punishment, and hence they cannot provide any answers
to the motivating questions of our analysis. In this regard, the tradeo￿ in our model
between the intensity and duration of punishment and its relationship to the absence of
commitment on the side of the principal is novel to the literature on punishment.30
4.3 Comparative Statics
In this section, we consider the e￿ect of three factors on the e￿cient likelihood, intensity,
and duration of intervention. First, we consider the e￿ect of a decline in the cost of
intensity to the principal (A). Second, we consider the e￿ect of a rise in the cost of distur-
bances to the principal (￿).31 Finally, we consider the e￿ect of a rise in the cost of e￿ort
to the agent (￿), where this can occur for instance if it becomes more politically costly
for the agent to antagonize rival factions contributing to disturbances or alternatively if
he acquires a higher preference for the realization of disturbances. We make the following
assumption to facilitate our discussion.
Assumption 4 g (i) = i￿ for 0 < ￿ < 1.
As we discuss further below, the only purpose of this assumption is to make the e￿ect
28See Dal B￿ o and Di Tella (2003) and Dal B￿ o, Dal B￿ o and di Tella (2006) for an application to political
capture and Chwe (1990) and Acemoglu and Wolitzky (2009) for labor contracts with limited liability.
29See, for instance, the seminal articles by Becker (1968) and Polinsky and Shavell (1979,1984).
30Because applying punishments is costly to the principal, static models need to assume that the
principal can commit to some punishment intensity as a function of observable outcomes.
31One can also interpret this parameter as re￿ecting the preferences of the principal, so an increase in
￿ re￿ects a transition to a principal who is less tolerant of disturbances.
20on duration of a change in A or ￿ unambiguous. The comparative statics are summarized
in the below proposition.32
Proposition 3 (comparative statics)
1. If A decreases (increases), then l￿ decreases (increases), i￿ increases (decreases),
and d￿ decreases (increases),
2. If ￿ increases (decreases), then l￿ decreases (increases), i￿ increases (decreases),
and d￿ decreases (increases), and
3. If ￿ increases (decreases), then l￿ increases (decreases), i￿ increases (decreases), and
d￿ decreases (increases):
This proposition states that all three changes increase the e￿cient intensity and de-
crease the e￿cient duration of intervention. However, only the third change also raises
its likelihood whereas the ￿rst two changes decrease its likelihood.
To see why intensity must rise, consider the ￿rst case. If the cost of intensity declines,
then the principal’s return to intensity rises since it is cheaper to provide incentives to
the agent via intensive force.33 In the second case, if the cost of disturbances rise, the
principal should raise the intensity of intervention since the return to delegating to the
agent rises relatively to direct control. As direct control worsens, higher intensity becomes
incentive compatible. In the third case, if the cost of e￿ort for the agent rises, then it is
harder for the principal to provide incentives to the agent with lower levels of intensity,
and higher levels of intensity become e￿cient.34 In all three cases, because the principal
32Performing comparative statics with respect to the probability of a disturbance is not straightforward
given that this would a￿ect the values of ￿p, ￿a (￿), and ￿a (0) jointly. However, one can show that a
uniform proportional increase in these probabilities has the same e￿ect as an increase in ￿. Details
available upon request.
33This is arguably the case in some of our motivating examples, since international rebuke against
the use of violence in restive regions changes over time and often causes governments to change their
intervention strategy.
34This comparative static is particularly ￿tting for understanding the case of the Roman Empire,
which utilized more brutal force in the western region of the Empire{where chieftain control was tenuous
and therefore needed higher e￿ort{ relative to the eastern regions{where client rulers had more control.
Speci￿cally, Luttwak (1975) writes:
"[T]he client rulers of the east normally enjoyed secure political control over their sub-
jects...By contrast, in the less structured polities of Europe, the prudence of the well-
informed would not necessarily restrain all those capable of acting against Roman interest...
[O]ne can therefore say that while Roman military power was freely converted into political
power vis-￿ a-vis the sophisticated polities of the East, when employed against the primitive
peoples of Europe its main use was the direct application of force." (p.32-33)
21needs more inducement to use more intensive punishments, these increases in the level of
intensity necessitate a decline in the duration of intervention.
Though all three changes increase the intensity and decrease the duration of interven-
tion, only the third also raises its likelihood. Speci￿cally, if the cost of intensity to the
principal declines or if the cost of disturbances to the principal rises, then higher intensity
slackens the agent’s incentive constraint. As a consequence, the principal can a￿ord to
forgive him more often without weakening incentives, and the likelihood of intervention
declines. In contrast, if the cost of e￿ort to the agent rises, then incentives are harder to
provide for the agent, so that likelihood of intervention must rise following the realization
of a disturbance.
Note that the comparative statics with respect to the likelihood and the duration
of intervention rely on the fact that the principal responds optimally to changes in the
environment by increasing the level of intensity. To see why, consider the e￿ect of each of
these factors absent any change in the level of intensity, where the ensuing hypothetical
suboptimal equilibrium can be constructed as in Section 4.2. Consider the e￿ect of a
decrease in the cost of intensity to the principal or an increase in the cost of disturbances
to the principal absent any change in i. In this circumstance, the implied likelihood
of intervention declines and implied duration of intervention rises. This is because it
becomes easier to provide incentives to the principal to use force (i.e., either the cost
of force is lower or the marginal bene￿t of resuming cooperation rises). Since incentives
to the principal are easier to provide but i is ￿xed, the duration of intervention can
rise. Therefore punishment becomes more severe for the agent, and the likelihood of
intervention declines.35 In contrast, when i￿ is allowed to adjust, Proposition 3 shows
that the increase in intensity is so large that it requires a reduction in the duration of
intervention. This ￿nal comparative static relies on Assumption 4, and one can construct
environments in which a decline in A or a rise in ￿ would barely change i￿, thereby
generating an increase in the duration of intervention.36
Analogously, one can consider the e￿ect of a rise in the cost of e￿ort to the agent, ab-
sent any change in i. In this circumstance, the implied likelihood of intervention rises and
the implied duration of punishment declines. This is because it becomes more di￿cult to
provide incentives to the agent to exert high e￿ort, so that the likelihood of intervention
rises, reducing the value of cooperation for the principal. Because the principal puts lower
value on cooperation, the duration of intervention must decline so as to provide the prin-
35Formally, this is equivalent to stating that d(i) is decreasing in A and increasing in ￿.
36This would be true for instance if g (￿) features high curvature around i￿, for instance if
￿i￿g00 (i￿)=g0 (i￿) > 1:
22cipal with enough inducement to exert the same level of intensity. In this circumstance,
the optimal level of intensity rises and therefore mitigates the rise in the likelihood of
intervention, and this reinforces the decline in the duration of intervention.37
5 Extensions
Our benchmark model ignores four additional issues. First, it ignores the possibility that
the principal can pay the agent for reducing disturbances. Second, it ignores the possibility
that permanent concessions by the principal can reduce the presence of disturbances in
the future. Third, it ignores the possibility that the agent’s identity can change over
time because of political transitions. Fourth, it ignores the possibility that high intensity
levels by the principal today can raise the cost of e￿ort by the agent in the future, for
example if the agent becomes more antagonistic. These issues are discussed in the below
four extensions which show that our main conclusions are unchanged.38
5.1 Temporary Payments
Our benchmark model ignores the presence of payments from the principal to the agent
which are standard in principal-agent relationships. Consider an extension of our model
where if the principal does intervene at t (ft = 0), he chooses a payment ct ￿ 0 which he
makes to the agent prior to the choice of e￿ort by the agent. Thus, conditional on ft = 0,
the payo￿ to the principal at t is ￿ct ￿ st￿ and the payo￿ to the agent is ct ￿ et. Under
this extension, our model is isomorphic to Fong and Li (2009) with the exception that
their model is a special case of ours with it constrained to 0 at every date.
Under this extension, the prospect of future payment can serve as a reward for the
successful avoidance of disturbances and the use of intervention continues to serve as a
punishment for disturbances. Moreover, payment is never used during intervention since
the principal would like to make the agent su￿er as much as possible. As such, the second
part of Proposition 1, Proposition 2, and Proposition 3 are preserved.
More speci￿cally, if a su￿cient number of disturbances occur, then continuation val-
ues must decline below U de￿ned in (8) and punishment necessarily occurs. Intuitively,
because of limited liability, it is ine￿cient to provide incentives using payments alone,
and it is e￿cient to use punishments in the form of intervention. Moreover, by analogous
37The rise in the likelihood of intervention occurs independently of Assumption 4 since the principal
must be strictly worse o￿ if ￿ rises.
38Due to space restrictions, we describe these results informally, but more details are available upon
request.
23reasoning as in Proposition 1, continuation values cannot rise above U once they have
declined below it. Therefore, continuation values must be trapped below U if intervention
is ever used along the equilibrium path, and no payment will ever be made going forward
in this situation.
The main di￿erence between the benchmark model and the extended model is that
under some conditions, the extended model admits another long run equilibrium in which
intervention is not used.39 In this alternate long run equilibrium which is described in
Fong and Li (2009), the principal does not use intervention, and he only uses payment in
the provision of incentives. More speci￿cally, the long run equilibrium features a payment
phase in which the principal pays the agent and a no-payment phase in which the principal
does not pay the agent. In both phases, the principal requests high e￿ort from the agent.
The absence of a disturbance leads to a probabilistic exit from the no-payment phase and
the presence of a disturbance leads to a probabilistic exit from the payment phase.
Thus, the equilibrium of the extended model can feature history-dependence in the
long run contract. On the one hand, su￿cient absences of disturbances can lead to an
equilibrium which features no intervention and repeated payment.40 On the other hand, a
su￿cient realization of disturbances can lead to an equilibrium which features no payment
and repeated intervention as in our benchmark model.
5.2 Permanent Concessions
Consider an extension of our benchmark model where if the principal does not intervene
at t (ft = 0), he can choose a permanent concession which we refer to as Ct = f0;1g. If
Ct = 0, then no concession is made and the rest of the period proceeds as in our benchmark
model. In contrast, if Ct = 1, a permanent concession is made which ends the game and
provides a continuation value JC to the principal and UC to the agent starting from t. Such
a concession can come in the form of independence, land, or political representation, for
instance, and we assume that it satis￿es the agent and ends all disturbances. Speci￿cally,
suppose that UC > 0, so that it provides the agent with more utility than low e￿ort
forever.
Clearly, if JC < J, then the principal cannot possibly be induced to make a concession
since he prefers permanent direct control. Therefore, the equilibrium would be exactly as
the one we have characterized. Conversely, if JC > ￿￿a (￿)￿=(1 ￿ ￿), then the e￿cient
39This requires a condition which guarantees the existence of a trigger-strategy equilibrium in which
payment induces high e￿ort. Absent this condition, the unique long run equilibrium involves repeated
intervention.
40This is also the case if the initial condition U0 is chosen to be su￿ciently high.
24equilibrium involves no intervention since the concession provides a better payo￿ to the
principal than the best payo￿ under indirect control. In this case, the principal simply
makes the concession in period 0 and the game ends. We therefore consider the more
interesting case in which JC 2 (J;￿￿a (￿)￿=(1 ￿ ￿)).
In this situation, the provision of this concession serves as a reward for the successful
avoidance of disturbances and the use of intervention continues to serve as a punishment
for disturbances.41 Clearly, if a su￿cient number of disturbances are avoided, then in-
tervention never takes place and the long run equilibrium features the concession by the
principal together with the end of all con￿ict so as to reward the agent for good behavior.
In contrast, if a su￿cient number of disturbances occur, then continuation values de-
cline below U de￿ned in (8) and punishment necessarily occurs. Moreover, by analogous
reasoning as in Proposition 1, continuation values cannot rise above U once they have
declined below it. Therefore, continuation values must be trapped below U if intervention
is ever used along the equilibrium path, and no concession will ever be made going forward
in this situation.
The equilibrium of the extended model thus admits two potential long run outcomes,
one with a permanent concession and the other which is analogous in structure to the
one which we consider. Thus, as in our benchmark environment, the second equilibrium
features phases of cooperation and punishment which sustain each other, it features a
tradeo￿ between the intensity and duration of intervention, and it features the same
comparative statics. Nevertheless, the equilibrium is not quantitatively identical to the
one in the benchmark model precisely because the min-max for the principal is now JC
as opposed to J. In other words, the principal cannot experience a continuation value
below that which he can guarantee himself by making a concession to the agent. This
implies that the agent’s welfare under punishment U must be higher in the extended
model. Thus, the likelihood of punishment is higher and its duration shorter because it
is harder to provide incentives to the principal and to the agent.42
As an aside, note that if the principal lacks commitment to concessions and if a
concession costs the principal JC (1 ￿ ￿) in every period, then nothing changes as long as
JC > J, since concessions can be enforced. If instead JC < J, then temporary concessions
may be featured along the equilibrium path, but the long run characterization of the
equilibrium is exactly as in our benchmark model.
41This is because rewarding the agent by allowing low e￿ort is ine￿cient for the principal as well as
the agent.
42We have implicitly assumed that an analogous condition to Assumption 3 holds so that the implied
duration of punishment is bounded away from zero.
255.3 Political Transitions
Our model additionally ignores the role of political transitions since it assumes that the
two players interact with each other forever. This issue is particularly relevant for the
case of the agent since the dynamics of the equilibrium are generated by the need for
the principal to punish the agent for the realization of past disturbances. Clearly, there
is no need for the principal to punish an agent who cannot possibly be blamed for past
disturbances.
To explore this issue further, imagine if in every period there is a probability 1￿q that
the incumbent agent is exogenously replaced by another identical agent, where replace-
ment yields an exogenous continuation value to the incumbent. Moreover, to simplify
discussion, consider the e￿cient sequential equilibrium which maximizes the principal’s
period 0 welfare, where the e￿cient equilibrium now clearly speci￿es the identity of the
agent whom the principal faces.
It is easy to show that in such a setting, the second part of Proposition 1 will hold for
the long run interaction between the principal and a given agent, where ￿ in Proposition
1 and in (8) is replaced by ￿q which corresponds to the relevant discount factor for the
agent.43 In other words, our characterization of the cooperative and punishment phases
holds for the interaction between the principal and an agent after several disturbances have
occurred during the agent’s tenure. This equilibrium features phases of cooperation and
punishment which sustain each other. Moreover, one can show that for q su￿ciently close
to 1, it features the same tradeo￿ between the intensity and duration of intervention, and
it features same exact comparative statics. Nonetheless, the model is not quantitatively
equivalent to our benchmark environment since the principal’s and the agent’s discount
factors di￿er from one another. Moreover, one can show that as q declines, it becomes
more di￿cult for the principal to provide incentives to the agent so that the likelihood of
intervention rises and the duration of intervention declines.
An important new feature of the extended model which is not present in the benchmark
model in that a political transition causes the continuation value to the agent to rise
above U. This is because it is ine￿cient for the principal to punish an agent who is
not responsible for the exertion of e￿ort in the past by providing him with low welfare.
Note further that it is straightforward to combine this extension with that of Section 5.2
which allows the principal to make a permanent concession. In such a setting, the long
run will always feature a permanent concession by the principal. This is because even
43This statement refers to the continuation value to the agent adjusted by the continuation value
associated with replacement.
26if one agent is punished and may never receive the concession himself, there is always a
positive probability going forward that the agent which replaces him will be successful at
preventing disturbances and will therefore be rewarded with a permanent concession.
An additional issue to consider is the possibility that the principal can endogenously
replace the agent with another identical agent via assassination or demotion. More specif-
ically, imagine if at the beginning of every period, the principal can replace the agent,
where replacement provides the agent with a continuation value UR, where for simplicity
we assume that UR is strictly below U in the equilibrium which does not allow for replace-
ment. Replacement entails an exogenous cost ￿ ￿ 0 borne by the principal, capturing the
cost of removal of the incumbent or training of a replacement agent.44 Our benchmark
model is embedded in this extended model for ￿ = 1, so that replacement is in￿nitely
costly to the principal, and it is never chosen along the equilibrium path since it is strictly
dominated by direct control. Moreover, it is clear that if ￿ = 0, then intervention is never
used as a form of punishment since it is strictly dominated by costless replacement.45 In
this situation, our extended model is analogous to the classical Ferejohn (1986) model of
electoral control, with the exception that we consider history-dependent strategies. More
generally, one can show that there is a cuto￿ for the cost of replacement ￿
￿ below which
replacement serves as the unique form of punishment and above which intervention is the
unique form of punishment.46 Thus, our model coincides exactly to the case for which
the cost c exceeds the cuto￿.
5.4 Endogenous E￿ort Cost
Our model additionally ignores the fact that the use of intensity by the principal can
potentially make it more di￿cult for the agent to exert e￿ort in preventing disturbances.
This would occur if the agent loses political credibility with the population he is supposed
to control. To explore this issue further, imagine if the cost of high e￿ort ￿ depends on
time so that it is denoted by ￿t and it can either be low (￿t = ￿L) or high (￿t = ￿H):
44In this environment, we can ignore without any loss of generality the principal’s incentives to replace
an incumbent since this does not provide any additional welfare to the principal given that future agents
are identical to the incumbent. Speci￿cally, any out of equilibrium removal of an incumbent can prompt
all future agents to punish the principal by exerting zero e￿ort forever.
45Technically, the upward sloping portion of J (￿) is replaced by a ￿at region along which probabilistic
replacement takes place.
46The argument behind the presence of a unique form of punishment is analogous to that behind
Lemma 3 in the Appendix.





if fk = 1 and ik >e i for any k < t
otherwise
.
This means that if the principal ever exceeds a certain level of intensity, then the cost of
high e￿ort for the agent permanently rises. Moreover, supposee i is below the optimal level
of intensity in an environment in which ￿t = ￿L for all t. This means that if the principal
uses the same level of intensity as in our benchmark environment, the cost of e￿ort for
the agent permanently rises.
Imagine if the level of ￿H is su￿ciently low that one can construct an equilibrium
with the same structure as in our benchmark setting in which the agent can be induced
to exert this level of e￿ort. We can show that in this case the principal always lets the
cost of e￿ort rise in the extended model. The intuition for this is that the rise in the cost
of e￿ort to the agent serves as an additional form of long run punishment for the agent
and therefore provides even better incentives to the agent to exert high e￿ort along the
equilibrium path.
More speci￿cally, in the e￿cient equilibrium of the extended model, the principal
chooses the likelihood, intensity, and duration of intervention associated with the level
of e￿ort equal to ￿H in our benchmark model. Given Proposition 3, this means that
the likelihood of intervention is higher, the intensity of intervention is higher, and the
duration of intervention is lower compared to the original equilibrium in which the cost of
e￿ort does not rise and remains at ￿L. Therefore, the level of intensity rises to reinforce
the rise in the cost of e￿ort to the agent.
To understand this, note that the ￿rst instance of a punishment phase provides the
principal with a continuation value of J independently of whether the cost of e￿ort to the
agent rises or remains the same going forward. Therefore, from an ex-ante perspective,
the e￿cient strategy for the principal is to minimize the welfare under a punishment phase
for the agent so as to provide the best incentives for the agent to exert e￿ort along the
equilibrium path. In providing these ex-ante incentives, the principal therefore has two
options. One option is to choose it =e i so as to prevent the cost of e￿ort from rising. The
second option is to choose i￿ >e i and to let the cost of e￿ort rise, where i￿ represents the
level of intensity which minimizes the agent’s welfare from punishment conditional on the
cost of e￿ort equal to ￿H going forward. It is clear that the principal should choose the
second option since, starting from the punishment phase, the agent expects higher levels
of intensive force and a higher cost of e￿ort going forward under i￿ versus e i.
28Therefore, the long run equilibrium in this extended model features a cooperative and
punishment phase which sustain each other as in our benchmark environment, though
these are associated with a higher cost of e￿ort to the agent. Moreover, the tradeo￿
between the intensity and duration of intervention remain and none of our comparative
statics change.
As an aside, note that these conclusions change if instead ￿H is so high that one cannot
construct any equilibrium which sustains high e￿ort by the agent. In this situation, levels
of intensity above e i cannot be credibly used by the principal since the agent will never
exert high e￿ort in the future. Consequently, the optimal punishment for the principal
features a cooperative phase and a punishment phase as in our benchmark environment,
though the principal sets the level of intensity ate i in order to prevent the cost of e￿ort to
the agent from rising. Given Proposition 2, this means that there is a higher likelihood
of intervention, a lower intensity of intervention, and a longer duration of intervention in
comparison to our benchmark environment. Moreover, note that our comparative statics
in Proposition 3 must be modi￿ed to take into account the fact that the level of intensity
does not change with small changes in the environment. Consequently, not only is it the
case that the level of intensity does not change, but the duration of intervention actually
rises if A declines or if ￿ rises. This is because, holding the level of intensity constant,
these changes enhance the incentives of the principal to punish and hence increase the




As discussed in the introduction, there are many applications of our model. A particu-
larly relevant application to current a￿airs is counterinsurgency policy.47 The majority of
modern manuals of counterinsurgency agree that the best way to deal with insurgencies
is by obtaining the collaboration of the local leadership.48 This principle is ￿rst out-
lined in Galula (1963). In this seminal work he suggests that setting up indirect control
relationships might be helpful:
"[The counterinsurgent] may, at the same time, utilize to the utmost those
47In this application, the realization of a disturbance corresponds to a successful attack by insurgents.
See footnote 12 for how one can model the incentives of the insurgents in our framework.
48See Nagl (2002) for a discussion.
29who are willing to support him actively, giving them increased privileges and
power, and ruling through them, however disliked they may be." (p.102)
Similarly, he suggests that a counterinsurgent can obtain the collaboration of the local
leadership with the implicit threat of military intervention:
"The general line could be: stay neutral and peace will soon return to the
area. Help the insurgent, and we will be obliged to carry on more military
operations and thus in￿ict more destruction." (p.109)
Our model of indirect control is thus relevant for counterinsurgency policy. Specif-
ically, the use of military interventions in this scenario is an important issue in policy
discussions. Indeed, some experts have defended the use of punitive interventions. For
example, military strategist Luttwak (2007) writes:
"The simple starting point is that insurgents are not the only ones who
can intimidate or terrorize civilians. For instance, whenever insurgents are
believed to be present in a village, small town, or distinct city district...the
local notables can be compelled to surrender them to the authorities, under
the threat of escalating punishments...Occupiers can thus be successful without
need of any specialized counterinsurgency methods or tactics if they are willing
to out-terrorize the insurgents, so that the fear of reprisals outweighs the desire
to help the insurgents or their threats." (p.40-41)
Our model makes three contributions to this policy discussion. First, the model iden-
ti￿es circumstances in which temporary costly interventions{which serve as a form of
punishment to the local agent{are optimal. More speci￿cally, it shows that this requires
the presence of political economy frictions: double-sided lack of commitment and asym-
metric information. It also requires certain additional assumptions. For example, it is
necessary that the local agent be more e￿cient at controlling insurgents relative to the
government (Assumption 1) since delegation is otherwise suboptimal. Moreover, it is
necessary that the use of excessive force by the government be su￿ciently painful to the
local agent (g0 (0) is su￿ciently high) since otherwise temporary costly intervention is
suboptimal. Finally, our extensions of Section 5.1 and 5.2 suggest that even if temporary
and costly interventions are sometimes optimal, they need only be used if a su￿cient
number of disturbances have occurred. Otherwise, the optimal policy in the model is to
provide incentives in the form of rewards, either in the form of payment or in the form
30of a permanent concessions such as infrastructure investment, political representation, or
autonomy.
The second contribution of the model to the policy discussion is that it identi￿es
basic principles that the government must consider when conducting a costly intervention.
Importantly, maximal force is ine￿cient, both because the government must actually use
it in equilibrium and also because, if it is too expensive for the government, then it will not
be used for su￿ciently long. In other words, the government should take into account its
own inability to commit to using force. Moreover, according to the model, the government
should use costly intervention as seldomly as possible. What our analysis in Section 4.2
shows is that the optimal contract sets the likelihood of intervention as low as possible
so that it is possible for the principal to forgive the agent as often as possible. Therefore
automatic knee-jerk reactions after every disturbance are a signal of suboptimal conduct.
In addition, the analysis of Section 4.3 provides precise conditions under which the use of
force should be increased or decreased.
The third contribution of the model is that it sheds some light on the role of interna-
tional pressure against the use of violent interventions (i.e., a rise in A). On the one hand,
Proposition 3 states that a government responds to an increase in international pressure
by reducing intensity i￿, which is the intended consequence of this international pressure.
However, on the other hand, Proposition 3 also predicts that the government will also
respond with a higher frequency of intervention (higher l￿) and a higher duration of in-
tervention (higher d￿). In sum, international pressure alone cannot remove the need for
intervention, and it can have the unintended consequence of making them more frequent
and longer. Nonetheless, to the extent that the international community can play a role,
the extension in Section 5.2 suggests that one method of actually eradicating equilibrium
interventions is to pursue policies which make permanent concessions more desirable than
indirect control to the government in question (e.g., setting JC above ￿￿a (￿)￿=(1 ￿ ￿)
via favors, international concessions, or foreign aid).
6.2 Example: Israel in Palestinian Territories
In this section, we consider the historical example of Israeli policy in the Palestinian
Territories following the Oslo Accords of 1993. This set of agreements put Israel and the
Palestinian Authority (PA) in a relationship of indirect control.49 More speci￿cally, under
49Jamal (2005) writes: "This policy of strict control over all realms of life continued until the estab-
lishment of the PA in 1994; then the occupied territories were divided into three areas with di￿erent legal
status, and Israeli control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip was transformed from direct to indirect"
(p.29). See also Kristianasen (1999) and Said (2000).
31this set of arrangements, Israel would free areas from military occupation in exchange for
the PA’s agreement to exert the highest e￿ort in minimizing terrorist attacks against
Israel from these areas.50 As in our model, it soon became clear that Israel reserved the
right to intervene militarily, and further progress along the peace process (i.e., the making
of concessions as in Section 5.2) was conditional on the absence of Palestinian violence.51
There was a clear informational asymmetry between Israel and the PA regarding the
e￿orts of the latter. While the extent to which the PA consistently exerted e￿ort is
unknown, there are some instances in which visible actions were taken. For example,
1200 suspected islamists were arrested, the Islamic University and some thirty Hamas
institutions were raided, and the Gaza mosques were put under PA control following a
string of suicide bombings in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem in 1996. There are other examples
of such crackdowns, and also rumours that the PA cooperated with the Israeli Defense
Forces by providing information on the location of Hamas and Islamic Jihad activists
throughout the 1990s.52 Nevertheless, at other instances, the extent of PA cooperation
was unclear, and indeed, Prime Minister Sharon repeatedly accused Yasser Arafat of not
being a "partner for peace."53
While our paper focuses on the e￿cient equilibrium, a natural question concerns the
extent to which the reaction of actors in the world is in line with what is prescribed by
the equilibrium strategies in our model. In particular, there is no question that there was
a steady increase in Israeli military intensity and punitive measures, such as house demo-
litions and assassinations, throughout the 1990s. This rise culminated in the restoration
of military control over the entirety of the West Bank in 2002.54 Whether or not this shift
in Israeli policy was optimal is an important question which cannot be answered here.
50Beinin (2006) writes: "Rabin initially saw the Declaration of Principles as a security arrangement.
Shortly before its approval he explained:
I prefer the Palestinians to cope with the problem of enforcing order in Gaza. The
Palestinians will be better at it than we because they will allow no appeals to the Supreme
Court and will prevent the Association for Civil Rights from critizising conditions there by
denying it access to the area." (p.29)
In the interim agreement on the West Bank and Gaza reached in 1995 (known either as Oslo II or
Taba Accords) it is explicitly stated: "Except for the Palestinian Police and the Israeli military forces, no
other armed forces shall be established or operate in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip." Therefore, the
PA was charged with uprooting armed factions. These security guarantees were even more explicit in the
Wye River Memorandum of 1998, where the PA is required to outlaw and combat terrorist organizations.
51For instance, Israel militarily intervened with a closure of the territories after the 1996 suicide bomb-
ings. See Rabbani (2006).
52See Kristianasen (1999).
53See, for instance, his declarations on April 2nd, 2002.
54See Hammami and Tamari (2006).
32However, what we can ask is the following: could the increase in military intensity be
understood through the lens of our model?
Our comparative statics from section 4.3 suggest that our model may guide us in
understanding these patterns. More speci￿cally, there are three parameter changes which
can result in increases in intensity in our model. First, and most obvious, the model
predicts that an increase in intensity follows an increase in ￿, the cost to Israel of a
Palestinian attack. The increasing use of suicide bombings by Hamas and Islamic Jihad
throughout the 1990s might thus explain the rise in the Israeli use of force. Moreover,
following Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount in September 28, 2000, there was a
dramatic increase in the number of terrorist attacks as part of the al-Aqsa Intifada.55
Such increase in the deadliness and frequency of terrorist attacks is therefore in line with
the rise in Israel’s intensity of intervention.56
Second, the model predicts that an increase in ￿, the cost to the agent of preventing
disturbances, is also associated with an increase in the intensity of intervention. This cost
can increase due to a loss of legitimacy of the agent, or due to an increased preference for
attacks by the agent (or the population he is representing). These two forces were present
in the Palestinian territories. The perception that Israel was not keeping up its side of
the bargain, mostly due to the growth in settler population, together with the rampant
corruption in the PA administration both increased the popularity enjoyed by Hamas,
and with it the support for terrorist activities. In December 1995, 77.9% of Palestinians
supported the peace process, but such support steadily declined and was only 44.1% in
December 1999.57
Finally, the model also predicts an increase in intensity if there is a reduction in the
marginal cost of violence, A. After 9/11 international public opinion and in particular
American opinion became more tolerant of heavy handed action against terrorism.58 To
the extent that international rebuke is a large component of A, such changes in attitudes
may have contributed to the rise in military intensity by Israel.
While we show that the shift in Israeli policy was in the same direction as implied by
our model’s comparative statics, we cannot claim that Israel’s use of military intervention
55In terms of the model, this can be seen both as an increase in ￿ or an increase in ￿a and ￿p.
56See Baliga and Sj￿ ostr￿ om (2009) for an interesting model of provocateurs that incite escalation.
57Data from the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center, as cited in Jamal (2005,p151). On the
steady erosion of PA popularity leading to the outbreak of the second Intifada, see also Hammami and
Tamari (2001).
58When asked in a Time/CNN survey days after the attacks, 41% reported feeling less favorable
toward Palestinians as a result of 9/11, and just 3% felt more favorable. This information is available at
http://www.americans-world.org/digest/regional issues/IsraelPalestinians/viewIsrPal.cfm
33was itself optimal or that its itensity was optimally chosen.59 Nonetheless, our discussion
suggests that the comparative statics in the model are in line with the tradeo￿s faced by
actual policymakers in the world.
7 Conclusion
We have characterized the e￿cient use of repeated interventions in a model of indirect
control. Our explicit closed form solution for the long run dynamics of the e￿cient se-
quential equilibrium highlights a fundamental tradeo￿ between the intensity and duration
of interventions. It also allows us to consider the separate e￿ects of a fall in the cost of
intensity to the principal, a rise in the cost of disturbances to the principal, and a rise in
the cost of e￿ort to the agent.
Our model abstracts from a number of potentially important issues. First, in answer-
ing our motivating questions, we have abstracted away from the static components of
intervention and the means by which a principal directly a￿ects the level of disturbances
(i.e., we let ￿p be exogenous). Future work should also focus on the static features of
intervention and consider how they interact with the dynamic features which we describe.
Second, we have ignored the presence of persistent sources of private information. For
example, the agent’s cost of e￿ort could be unobservable to the principal. Alternatively,
the principal may have a private cost of using force. In this latter scenario, a principal
with a high cost of force may use more intensive force in order to pretend to have a low
cost and to provide better inducements to the agent. We have ignored the presence of
persistent hidden information not for realism but for convenience since it maintains the
common knowledge of preferences over continuation contracts and simpli￿es the recursive
structure of the e￿cient sequential equilibria. Understanding the interaction between
persistent and temporary hidden information is an important area for future research.
59To make such statements one would have to argue that the conditions outlined in the previous sub-
section (including whether a su￿cient number of disturbances ocurred before intervention, and whether
the use of positive incentives such as territorial concessions was contemplated and used) were satis￿ed.
348 Appendix
8.1 Equilibrium De￿nition
We consider equilibria in which each player conditions his strategy on past public infor-
mation. Let h0
t = fz1t;ft￿1;z2t￿1;it￿1;st￿1g, the history of public information at t after
the realization of z1
t.60 Let h1
t = fh0
t;ft￿1;z2tg, the history of public information at t after
the realization of z2
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t correspond to continuation
strategies following h0
t and h1
t, respectively. Let ￿jjh0
t and ￿jjh1
t denote the entire set of
feasible continuation strategies for j after h0
t and h1
t, respectively.









































In order to build a sequential equilibrium allocation which is generated by a particular
strategy, let q0
t = fz1t;z2t￿1;st￿1g and q1
t = fz1t;z2t;st￿1g, the exogenous equilibrium
history of public signals and states after the realizations of z1
t and z2
t, respectively. De￿ne






















Let F denote the set of feasible allocations ￿ with continuation allocations from t











correspond to the equilibrium continuation value to player j fol-
lowing the realization of q0
t and q1
t, respectively. The following lemma provides necessary
and su￿cient conditions for ￿ to be generated by sequential equilibrium strategies.
60Without loss of generality, we let it = 0 if ft = 0 and et = 0 if ft = 1.
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for Up = ￿￿p￿=(1 ￿ ￿) and some Ua ￿ wa=(1 ￿ ￿).
Proof. Step 1. The necessity of (14) for j = p follows from the fact that the principal
can choose f0
k (q0
k) = 1 8k ￿ t and 8q0
k and i0
k (q1
k) = 0 8k ￿ t and 8q1
k, and this delivers
continuation value Up. The necessity of (14) for j = a follows from the fact that the agent
can choose e0
k (q1
k) = 0 8k ￿ t and 8q1
k, and this delivers a continuation value of at least
Ua. Step 2. The necessity of (15) follows from the fact that conditional on ft (q0
t) = 1, the
principal can choose f0
k (q0
k) = 1 8k > t and 8q0
k and i0
k (q1
k) = 0 8k ￿ t and 8q1
k, and this
delivers continuation value ￿￿p￿ + ￿Up. The necessity of (16) follows from the fact that
conditional on f0
t (q0
t) = 0, the agent can unobservably choose e0
t (q1
t) 6= et (q1
t) and follow
the equilibrium strategy 8k > t and 8q1
k. Step 3. For su￿ciency, consider a feasible
allocation which satis￿es (14) ￿ (16) and construct the following o￿-equilibrium strategy.
Any observable deviation by the principal results in a reversion to the repeated static Nash
equilibrium. We only consider single period deviations since ￿ < 1 and since continuation
values are bounded. If f0
t (q0
t) = 1, then a deviation by the principal to f0
t (q0
t) = 0 is
weakly dominated by (14) and Assumption 2. Moreover, a deviation by the principal to
i0 (q1
t) 6= i(q1
t) is weakly dominated by (15). If ft (q0
t) = 0, then a deviation by the principal
to f0
t (q0
t) = 1 is weakly dominated by (14). If ft (q0
t) = 0, then a deviation by the agent to
e0
t (q1
t) 6= et (q1
t) is weakly dominated by (16).
8.2 Implications of Assumption 3
The value of b ￿ satis￿es












￿a (0) ￿ ￿a (￿)




for i￿ which satis￿es (9). Given the functions l(i) and d(i) de￿ned in Section 4.2, the
￿rst part of this assumption implies that l(0) < 1 so that an equilibrium in which high
e￿ort is sustained by the threat of the repeated static Nash equilibrium exists. Since l(i)
is declining in i for i < i￿ by Proposition 2, this assumption guarantees that l(i￿) < 1.
The second part of this assumption implies that d(i￿) > 0. These features guarantee that




are self-generating so that the long run equilibrium can be
explicitly characterized.
8.3 Proofs of Additional Lemmas
In this section we prove several important lemmas which are required for proving our
propositions. Let ￿ represent the set of sequential equilibrium continuation values and
let Umax the highest continuation value to the agent in this set.
Lemma 2 (i) ￿ is convex and compact, (ii) J (U) = J (Umax) = J, and (iii) J (U) is
weakly concave.
Proof. Step 1. The weak concavity of the program and the convexity of the constraint
set in (1) ￿ (7) guarantees that ￿ is convex. Step 2. If we set an arbitrarily high upper
bound for i in (1) ￿ (7), then the compactness of the constraint set together with the fact
that ￿ < 1 guarantees that that ￿ is closed and bounded by the Dominated Convergence
Theorem. Step 3. By (3), J (U) ￿ J and J (Umax) ￿ J. Step 4. By Assumptions
1 and 2 and equations (4) and (6), it must be that f￿
z (U) = 1 8z since otherwise an
increase in fz for some z must satisfy (3) ￿ (7) and strictly reduces the welfare of the
agent. If J (U) > J, then an increase iz must satisfy (3) ￿ (7) and strictly reduces the
welfare of the agent. Therefore J (U) = J. Step 5. By Assumption 1 and equations
(4) and (6), f￿
z (Umax) = 0 8z since otherwise a decrease in fz for some z must satisfy
(3) ￿ (7) and strictly increase the welfare of the agent. If J (Umax) > J, then a decrease
in ez or an increase in UH
z strictly increases the welfare of the principal while satisfying
(3) ￿ (7), and if this were not feasible then Umax = 0, which violates (3) since it implies
J (Umax) = ￿￿a (0)￿. Therefore, J (Umax) = J. Step 6. The weak concavity of J (￿)
follows directly from the ￿rst and second parts of the lemma.
37Lemma 3 9i￿ s.t. the solution to (1) ￿ (7) cannot admit i￿
z (U) 6= i￿ for any z given
f￿
z (U) = 1.
Proof. Step 1. De￿ne i￿ = Ei￿
z (U). By Step 4 of the proof of Lemma 2, f￿
z (U) = 1 8z. It
must be that i￿
z (U) = i￿ 8z since otherwise a perturbation which sets i￿
z (U) = Ei￿
z (U) 8z
continues to satisfy (3)￿(7) and strictly reduces the welfare of the agent by the concavity




correspond to the maximizer of (1)￿(7) subject
to the additional constraints that fz = 1 and iz =b i 8z for some b i. Note that for any two







































J (U00) ￿ J (U0)
U00 ￿ U0 , (18)















=(1 ￿ ￿) denote the value








































< J (U) 8U and 8b i 6= i￿.
Step 4. By step 3, i￿
z (U) = i￿ if f￿
z (U) = 1 8z .
Lemma 4 9e U 2 (U;Umax) and some m > 0 s.t.
f
￿
z (U) = 0 8z and 8U ￿ e U and
J (U)
(
= J + m(U ￿ U)
< J + m(U ￿ U)
if U ￿ e U.
if U > e U
Proof. Step 1. Consider two continuation values U0 < U00 s.t. Ef￿
z (U0) > 0 and
Ef￿
z (U00) > 0. It follows given Lemma 3 that
J (U) = J (U
0) + m(U ￿ U




J (U00) ￿ J (U0)
U00 ￿ U0 .
38To see why, let UW￿ (U) correspond to the expected continuation value to the agent con-
ditional on fz = 1 and let UP￿ (U) correspond to the expected continuation value to the
agent conditional on fz = 0. Optimality and the concavity of J (￿) thus require















By (20) and the concavity of J (￿), it follows that UW￿ (U) and UP￿ (U) are on the

































By the concavity of J (￿), this implies UW￿ (U00) and UW￿ (U0) are on the same line seg-
ment. Therefore, (19) applies. Step 2. Since Ef￿
z (U) = 1 by step 3 of the proof of
Lemma 2, it follows from step 1 that (19) applies for U0 = U and some U00 = e U ￿ U.
It follows that f￿
z (U) = 0 8z and 8U ￿ e U if e U > U and f￿
z (U) = 0 8z and 8U > e U if
e U = U. Step 3. If e U = U, then Ef￿
z (U) = 0 8U > U, but this is not possible since (2)
and (6) imply that EUL￿
z (U) < U and cannot be arbitrarily close to U. Therefore m > 0.
Step 4. It cannot be that e U = Umax since this violates part 2 of Lemma 2:
Lemma 5 e U = U.
Proof. Step 1. e￿
z (U) = ￿ if f￿




. Suppose this is not the
case and consider a solution for which e￿
z (U) = 0 and f￿
z (U) = 0. Because the constraint
set is convex, one can perturb this solution without changing welfare so that (6) binds
and UL￿
z (U) = UH￿
z (U). However, this implies that UL￿
z (U) < ￿e￿
z (U) + ￿UL￿
z (U).












< J, which violates (3). Step 2.
Suppose U < e U. By Assumption 3, there exists a solution to (1) ￿ (7) s.t. f￿
z (U) = 0
and e￿




. Moreover, given the concavity of the program and
convexity of the constraint set in (1)￿(7) such a solution can feature UH￿
z (U) = UH￿ (U)
and UL￿










e U ￿ U























> e U, this violates Lemma 4. Step 3. Suppose U > e U so that by Lemma
4, J
￿
e U + ￿
￿




e U + ￿
￿
= ￿ and lets (6) bind so that UL￿
z
￿





e U + ￿
￿
< e U 8z. This
perturbation yields a payo￿ to the principal equal to J + m
￿
e U + ￿ ￿ U
￿
, violating the
de￿nition of e U in Lemma 4.
8.4 Proof of Proposition 1




to prove the second
part of the proposition and having done this we prove the ￿rst part of the proposition.
By steps 4 and 5 of the proof of Lemma 2 and by Lemma 4, the solution which satis￿es













wa ￿ g (i
￿










z (U) + ￿
￿














z (U) = 0
￿
,




and J (U) = J,


















to achieve an full description of equilibrium actions. Step 2. By Lemma
3 i￿





= ￿ 8z. Step 3. By





= U and UL￿
z (U) = U ￿ ￿=(￿ (￿a (0) ￿ ￿a (￿))) < U since
otherwise (6) does not bind and a perturbation which reduces UH
z and raises UL
z strictly
raises welfare. Step 4. The fact that UF￿
z (U) = (U ￿ wa + g (i￿))=￿ 8z is implied by (2)
and the fact that (5) binds since otherwise the principal is receiving a continuation value
above J. Step 5. We are left to characterize i￿ and U. Note that the equilibrium can be
represented by a system of 4 equations: (10) ￿ (12) and












(22) is an equality if d￿ ￿ 0 which occurs if (U ￿ wa + g (i￿))=￿ ￿ U, where we have





, U;l￿, i￿, and d￿, where the ￿fth unknown is pinned down by the fact




. Note that given steps 1-4, d￿ < 1 and





(1 ￿ ￿) ￿
￿
￿a (0)
￿a (0) ￿ ￿a (￿)
￿ ￿ wa + g (i￿)
￿￿ ￿ wa + g (i￿)
((￿p ￿ ￿a (￿))￿ + Ai
￿) ￿ (￿p￿ + Ai
￿),
(23)
which is an equality if and only if (22) is an equality. Step 6. Note that i￿ which
satis￿es (9) maximizes the right hand side of (23). Moreover, by Assumption 3, it is
the case in the optimum that (22) binds since the implied value of d￿ exceeds 0 so that
UF￿
z (U) = (U ￿ wa + g (i￿))=￿ ￿ U. Substitution into (11) yields U which completes the
proof of the second part. Step 7. Lemmas 4 and 5 imply that if Pr
￿
Ut ￿ U 8t
￿
> 0, then
Prfft = 0 8tg > 0. However, (2) and (6) imply that PrfUt+1 < Ut ￿ ￿jft = 0g > 0 8t for
some ￿ > 0, which means that Pr
￿
Ut ￿ U 8t
￿
= 0. Step 8. Pr
￿
Ut+1 ￿ UjUt ￿ U
￿
= 1




= 1 8U0. Q.E.D.
8.5 Proof of Proposition 2
Step 1. An equilibrium with the given structure satis￿es (10)￿(13) and entails functions
l(i) and d(i) de￿ned by:
1 ￿ ￿a (￿)l(i) =
￿a + ￿￿p ￿ 1
￿
￿
￿a + ￿p ￿ 1
￿
d(i) =
￿p + ￿￿a ￿ 1
￿
￿






￿a (0) ￿ ￿a (￿)
￿ ￿ wa + g (i)
￿￿ ￿ wa + g (i)
(24)
￿p =
(￿p ￿ ￿a (￿))￿
(￿p ￿ ￿a (￿))￿ + Ai
(25)
where Assumption 3 and the fact that ￿ < 1 implies ￿a 2 [0;1], ￿p 2 [0;1], and ￿a+￿p￿1 >
0 for all i ￿ i, where i > i￿. Step 2. By some algebra, l0 (i) has the same sign as
￿￿p@￿a=@i ￿ (1 ￿ ￿a)@￿p=@i which equals
￿￿p (1 ￿ ￿a)
￿
g0 (i)
￿￿ ￿ wa + g (i)
￿
A
(￿p ￿ ￿a (￿))￿ + Ai
￿
. (26)
41Since g (￿) is concave, it follows that (26) is negative if i < i￿ and positive if i > i￿. Step




@￿a=@i + ￿a@￿p=@i which equals
￿
A




0(i)(1 ￿ ￿a) ￿
￿
￿￿￿a (0)
￿a (0) ￿ ￿a (￿)




The element outside the square brackets is always positive. Consider i < i￿, where the
concavity of g (￿) guarantees that
￿g
0(i)[(￿a (￿) ￿ ￿p)￿ ￿ Ai] ￿ A(￿￿ ￿ (!a ￿ g(i))) > 0. (28)
By some algebra, one can show that given (28), the element inside the square brackets
in (27) is decreasing in i for i < i￿. Since d(0) = 1, it follows that d0 (0) ￿ 0, so




@￿a=@i + ￿a@￿p=@i can also be expressed as
￿
1 ￿ ￿p ￿ ￿a
￿ g0(i)




￿￿ ￿ (!a ￿ g(i))
+
A
(￿a (￿) ￿ ￿p)￿ ￿ Ai
￿
;
which is negative for i ￿ i￿ since the left hand side of (28) is weakly negative in this case.
Q.E.D.
8.6 Proof of Proposition 3
Step 1. Implicit di￿erentiation of (9) taking into account the concavity of g (￿) yields
the comparative statics with respect to i￿. Step 2. Given ￿a and ￿p de￿ned in the proof
of Proposition 2, it is the case that if a particular parameter x = fA;￿;￿g changes, the








where we have used the fact that ￿￿p@￿a=@i ￿ (1 ￿ ￿a)@￿p=@i = 0 at i￿. The e￿ect on





















42Step 3. Given (29), the comparative statics with respect to l￿ are implied by the fact that
@￿a=@A = @￿a=@￿ = 0, @￿a=@￿ < 0, @￿p=@A < 0, @￿p=@￿ > 0, and @￿p=@￿ = 0. Step
4. Given (30), the e￿ect of an increase in ￿ on d￿ is implied by the fact that @￿a=@￿ < 0,




@￿a=@i+￿a@￿p=@i < 0 from Proposition 2. Letting
x = A, substitution into (30) taking Assumption 4 into account together with @i=@A =























which has the same sign as ￿￿a + ￿p ￿ 1, which is unambiguously positive given the
de￿nition of i￿. Analogous arguments imply the comparative static with respect to ￿.
Q.E.D.
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